Abstract. We extend the Nelson-Oppen combination procedure to the case of theories that are compatible with respect to a common subtheory in the shared signature. The notion of compatibility relies on model completions and related concepts from classical model theory.
Introduction
Constraint solving problems, arising for instance in software verification, can be often formalized as the problem of proving the unsatisfiability of a set of literals modulo a background theory (Armando et al., 2001) . Given the heterogeneity of the involved datatypes, the background theory is usually the union of multiple theories each of them dealing, for instance, with lists, arrays, Booleans, integer or rational numbers, and the like (see, e.g., Oppen, 1980a for useful examples). Thus, constraint-solving problems naturally become combination problems and, as such, should (one hopes) be sensitive to a modular approach.
In more formal terms, this raises the following question: Is it possible to reduce unsatisfiability of a set of literals modulo the union of two or more theories to instances of the same problem that are relative to only one of the component theories? The Nelson-Oppen combination method (Nelson and Oppen, 1979; Oppen, 1980a; Tinelli and Harandi, 1996) provides a rather simple and positive answer for the case in which the involved theories are stably infinite and operate on disjoint signatures. In the literature, some attempts have been made to drop such limitations: for instance, in (Tinelli and Zarba, 2003) an asymmetric procedure is introduced that does not require stable infiniteness for all the component theories. In this paper we investigate the case in which the shared signature is not empty, and we propose a new approach based on classical model theory (in Robinson's style). We leave comparison with related work to Section 8; we shall explain here the basic features of our approach, which relies on a thorough investigation of the general reasons why the Nelson-Oppen method works.
In the original Nelson-Oppen combination procedure we are given theories T 1 , T 2 over disjoint signatures (with equality) 1 , 2 and we are dealing with the problem of deciding the consistency of sets of sentences such as
where i (i = 1, 2) are finite sets of ground literals in the signature i augmented with new shared free constants, say a = a 1 , . . . , a n . Let us call 0 the common signature 1 ∩ 2 (which is reduced in the Nelson-Oppen case to the only equality predicate). If (1) has a model M, then we can take the Robinson diagram (A) of the 0 -substructure A of M generated by a and realize that the two sets of sentences
are consistent as well, because M is a model of both of them. (A) simply specifies exhaustively whether for any i, j = 1, . . . , n, we have M |= a i = a j or M |= a i = a j . Since there are only finitely many such "arrangements" (A), clearly if the consistency of the two sets (2) is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the consistency of (1), then we actually have a combined decision procedure. The consistency of both the sets in (2) is not precisely sufficient for the consistency of (1); however, it is sufficient whenever T 1 , T 2 are stably infinite. This means that every model of T i (i = 1, 2) embeds into an infinite model of T i . In other words, we have the following fact (here a new ingredient, quantifier elimination, comes into the picture): the shared universal theory T 0 (which is nothing but the pure equality theory) can be extended to a theory T * 0 in the same signature 0 (namely, the theory of an infinite set), which is conservative over the universal fragment of T 0 and which, in addition, enjoys quantifier elimination. In the standard model-theoretic terminology, T * 0 is a model completion of T 0 , and stable infiniteness means that every model of T i (i = 1, 2) embeds into a model of T i ∪T * 0 . This extra hypothesis is indeed sufficient for the consistency of the two sets of sentences in (2) to imply the consistency of the set of sentences in (1), by a simple proof based on Robinson's Joint Consistency theorem (see the Appendix for details).
What does this argument need to work? It needs the following: (i) there is a universal theory T 0 in the shared signature 0 that is contained in both T 1 and T 2 ; (ii) T 0 admits a model-completion T * 0 ; (iii) every model of T i embeds into a model of T i ∪ T * 0 ; (iv) T 0 is effectively locally finite (see Section 6 for the definition of this extra condition, which is needed for having finitely many arrangements to try).
This analysis makes clear that our argument is quite general and extends the Nelson-Oppen procedure to nondisjoint cases: we shall use it in Section 6 to The usual definition of stable infiniteness required by the Nelson-Oppen procedure is not precisely this one but is equivalent to it by a simple compactness argument; see Proposition 4.2 below.
obtain, as special cases, results concerning, for example, fusion decidability in propositional modal logic (Wolter, 1998) .
Whenever only hypothesis (iv) fails, we no longer have a combined decision procedure. In this case, the method presented in this paper might still have some independent interest: for instance, it can be used in order to limit partial residue exchange of cooperating reasoners to disjunctions of positive literals in the shared signature (see Section 5), and it can be applied in saturation-based theorem proving in order to block inferences with mixed-languages premises, while still retaining refutational completeness (see Section 7).
We begin the paper with a couple of sections recalling the basic model-theoretic ingredients in more detail and providing also examples from natural software verification theories.
Preliminaries
A signature is a set of functions and predicate symbols (each of them endowed with the corresponding arity). We assume the binary equality predicate symbol '=' to be always present in any signature . To avoid confusion, we use in the metalanguage the symbol ≡ (instead of =) to mean identity of syntactic expressions.
The signature obtained from by the addition of a set of new constants (that is, 0-ary function symbols) X is denoted by ∪X or by X . We have the usual notions of -term, (full first order) -formula, -atom, -literal, -clause, -positive clause, and so forth. For example, atoms are just atomic formulas, literals are atoms and their negations, clauses are multisets of literals, positive clauses are multisets of atoms, and so forth. We usually improperly write clauses/positive clauses as disjunctions of the corresponding literals/atoms (in particular, the empty clause is always identified with the empty disjunction ⊥ expressing syntactic falsity). Letters φ, ψ, . . . are used for formulas, whereas letters A, B, . . . are used for literals and letters C, D, . . . are used for clauses. Terms, literals, clauses, and formulas are called ground whenever variables do not appear in them. Formulas without free variables are called sentences. The universal (resp. existential) closure of a formula φ is the sentence obtained from φ by adding it a prefix of universal (resp. existential) quantifiers binding all variables that happen to have a free occurrence in φ. If E is a term, a literal, or a clause, we occasionally use the standard automatic deduction notations E |p , E [s] p to denote the subterm at position p in E and the syntactic expression (term, literal, or clause) resulting from E by the replacement of the subterm at position p by the term s.
A -theory T is a set of sentences (called the axioms of T ) in the signature ; however, when we write T ⊆ T for theories, we may mean not just set-theoretic inclusion but the fact that all the axioms for T are logical consequences of the axioms for T .
From the semantic side, we have the standard notion of a -structure A: this is nothing but a support set endowed with an arity-matching interpretation of the function and predicate symbols from . We use f A (resp. P A ) to denote the interpretation of the function symbol f (resp. predicate symbol P ) in the structure A. The support set of a structure A is indicated by the notation |A|. Truth of aformula in A is defined in any one of the standard ways (so that truth of a formula is equivalent to truth of its universal closure). A formula φ is satisfiable in A iff its existential closure is true in A.
If 0 ⊆ is a subsignature of and if A is a -structure, the 0 -reduct of A is the 0 -structure obtained from A by forgetting the interpretation of function and predicate symbols from \ 0 .
A -structure A is a model of a -theory T (in symbols A |= T ) iff all axioms of T are true in A; for models of a -theory T we shall preferably use the letters M, N , . . . to distinguish them from arbitrary -structures. If φ is a formula, T |= φ ('φ is a logical consequence of T ') means that φ is true in any model of T (notice that T |= φ turns out to be equivalent to T |= ∀x φ, where ∀x φ is the universal closure of φ). A -theory T is complete iff for every -sentence φ, either φ or ¬φ is a logical consequence of T ; T is consistent iff it has a model (i.e., iff T |= ⊥).
The problems we deal with are word problems. More precisely, given atheory T , -the word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= A holds for a -atom A; -the conditional word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= C holds for a -clause C containing exactly one positive literal; -the clausal word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= C holds for a -clause C; -the elementary word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= φ holds for a first order -formula φ.
Finally, the constraint satisfiability problem for the constraint theory T is the problem of deciding whether (the conjunction of) a finite set of -literals is satisfiable in a model of T . The complementary constraint unsatisfiability problem (i.e., the problem of deciding whether a finite set of -literals is unsatisfiable in all the models of T ) is easily reduced to the clausal word problem: notice, in fact, that Tunsatisfiability of A 1 ∧· · ·∧A n is the same as the relation T |= ¬∃x (A 1 ∧· · ·∧A n ) (for the appropriate existential closure prefix ∃x), that is, as the relation T |= ∀x (¬A 1 ∨· · ·∨¬A n ). Conversely, T |= C (where C is the clause B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ B m ) is equivalent to T |= ∀x C and hence to the T -unsatisfiability of ¬B 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬B m . In the following, we shall prefer to use free constants instead of variables in constraint satisfiability problems, so that we (equivalently) redefine a constraint satisfiability
In the literature, there is also another definition of satisfiability for formulas that are not sentences (one says that φ is satisfiable iff its universal closure is true in some structure). The definition we adopted is the natural one for papers whose main focus is on constraint satisfiability.
problem for the theory T as the problem of establishing the consistency of T ∪ for a finite set of ground a -literals (where a is a finite set of new constants). An -embedding (or, simply, an embedding) between two -structures A and B is any mapping µ : |A| → |B| among the corresponding support sets satisfying the condition
for all |A| -atoms A (here A is regarded as a |A| -structure by interpreting each additional constant a ∈ |A| into itself and B is regarded as a |A| -structure by interpreting each additional constant a ∈ |A| into µ(a)). Notice the following facts: (a) as we have equality in the language, an embedding is an injective function; (b) an embedding µ : A → B must be an algebraic homomorphism; that is, for every n-ary function symbol f and for every a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ |A|, we must have
. . , a n )); (c) for an n-ary predicate symbol P we must have (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ P A iff (µ(a 1 ), . . . , µ(a n )) ∈ P B . It is easily seen that an embedding µ : A → B can be equivalently defined as a mapping µ : |A| → |B| satisfying (a), (b), (c) above.
If the embedding µ : A → B is an inclusion map, we say that A is a substructure of B or that B is an extension of A.
If ( * ) holds for all first-order formulas, the embedding µ is said to be an elementary embedding. Correspondingly, if µ is also an inclusion, we say that A is an elementary substructure of B or that B is an elementary extension of A.
The diagram (A) of a -structure A is the set of ground |A| -literals that are true in A; the elementary diagram e (A) of a -structure A is the set of |A| -sentences that are true in A. The Robinson (elementary) diagram theorem (Chang and Keisler, 1990) says that there is an (elementary) embedding between the -structures A and B iff it is possible to expand B to a |A| -structure in such a way that it becomes a model of the (elementary) diagram of A. This theorem (in combination with the compactness of the logical consequence relation) will be repeatedly used without explicit mention in the paper. A typical standard use is the following. Suppose that we want to embed A into a model of a theory T . Then it is sufficient to check that T ∪ (A) is consistent.
A formula is quantifier-free (or open) iff it does not contain quantifiers. Atheory T is said to eliminate quantifiers iff for every formula φ(x) ‡ there is a quantifier-free formula φ (x) such that
We recall that we use |A| to denote the support of A and that we use X (or sometimes also ∪ X) to denote the signature obtained from by adding it the set X as new free constants. Hence, the signature |A| (or ∪ |A|) is the signature obtained from by adding it new constants naming the elements of the support of A.
To see this, apply ( * ) to the |A| -atom f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = a, where a ∈ |A| is just f A (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
‡ By this notation, we mean that φ contains free variables only among the finite set x.
There are many well-known theories eliminating quantifiers (Chang and Keisler, 1990) . We give here some examples of interest for software verification. EXAMPLE 1. Linear integer arithmetic (i.e., the theory of the structure of integer numbers in the signature +, 0, 1, ≤, ≡ n ) eliminates quantifiers (Cooper, 1972; Oppen, 1980a) ; so does rational linear arithmetic (Weispfenning, 1988 ) (i.e., the theory of rational numbers in the signature +, 0, ≤). Another well-known classical example from Tarski is real arithmetic (i.e., the theory of real numbers in the signature +, 0, ·, 1, ≤).
EXAMPLE 2. The theory of acyclic lists L (Oppen, 1980a (Oppen, , 1980b eliminates quantifiers; this is the theory in the signature
consisting of the universal closures of the axioms
where t is a term built up from x by using finitely many applications of the unary function symbols car, cdr. Notice that all models of L are infinite: in fact, by the first three axioms, the interpretation of the symbol cons realizes, in any model M of L, a bijection M × M → M and such a bijection cannot exist if the support of M is a finite set having more than one element (it cannot have just one element because L |= ∀x(car(x) = x)).
Model Completions
The main ingredient of this paper is the well-known notion of a model completion of a theory. There are good chapters on that in all textbooks from model theory. We recall here just the essential definitions (readers may consult, e.g., MacIntyre, 1977; Chang and Keisler, 1990; Wheeler, 1976 for further information).
DEFINITION 3.1. Let T be a -theory, and let T * ⊇ T be a further -theory; we say that T * is a model completion of T iff (i) every model of T can be embedded into a model of T * and (ii) for every model M of T , we have that T * ∪ (M) is a complete theory (in the signature |M| ).
Quantifier elimination for this theory seems to be well known; it is included in early Mal'cev work (Mal'cev, 1962) . See, in any case, Appendix A in (Ghilardi, 2003) for a full proof.
One can show that a model completion T * of a theory T is unique, if it exists; see (Chang and Keisler, 1990 One can show that in the case in which T is a universal theory (namely, a theory having as axioms only universal closures of quantifier-free formulas), conditions (a)-(b) from Proposition 3.2 are actually equivalent to conditions (i)-(ii) from Definition 3.1 (see, for instance, Ghilardi, 2003; Ghilardi and Zawadowski, 2002; Chang and Keisler, 1990 for a proof). We shall not need such an equivalence in the following, although in this paper we shall consider model completions of universal theories only. EXAMPLE 3. The theory of an infinite set is the model completion of the pure theory of equality in the minimum signature containing only the equality predicate; the theory of dense total orders without endpoints is the model completion of the theory of total orders. EXAMPLE 4. There are many classical examples from algebra: the theory of algebraically closed fields is the model completion of the theory of fields, the theory of divisible torsion free Abelian groups is the model completion of the theory of torsion-free Abelian groups, and so forth. EXAMPLE 5. The theory of atomless Boolean algebras is the model completion of the theory of Boolean algebras (for model completions arising in the algebra of logic, see the book Ghilardi and Zawadowski, 2002) . We recall that an atom in a Boolean algebra B is a nonzero element that is minimal (among nonzero elements) with respect to the partial order induced by the lattice structure. A Boolean algebra B is atomless iff it has no atoms.
Recall that ground formulas are preserved by both substructures and extensions: in fact, such formulas are Boolean combinations of ground atoms, and ( * ) from Section 2 consequently applies. EXAMPLE 6. An old result in (Wheeler, 1976) says, in particular, that universal Horn theories T in finite signatures always have a model completion, provided the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) finitely generated models of T are all finite, and (b) amalgamation property holds for models of T . This fact can be used in order to prove the existence of a model completion for theories axiomatizing many interesting discrete structures (such as graphs or posets). EXAMPLE 7. It follows from the quantifier elimination result for the theory L of acyclic lists that this theory is the model completion of itself.
EXAMPLE 8. If a theory T
* has elimination of quantifiers, then it is the model completion of the theory T axiomatized by the set of universal sentences that are logical consequences of T * ; see (Chang and Keisler, 1990) .
T 0 -Compatibility
The key notion for our combination procedure is the following.
DEFINITION 4.1. Let T be a theory in the signature , and let T 0 be a universal theory in a subsignature 0 ⊆ admitting a model completion T * 0 . We say that T is T 0 -compatible iff
Condition (ii) can be equivalently stated in a slightly different form. Proof. This is just an immediate application of the following well-known lemma (take T to be T ∪ T * 0 ). P
LEMMA 4.3. Let T and T be both -theories. The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) every model of T can be embedded into a model of T ; (ii) every quantifier-free -formula that is satisfiable in a model of T is satisfiable also in a model of T .
The amalgamation property for models of T says that for every couple of embeddings µ 1 :
Notice that the existence of a model completion for T always implies amalgamation property for models of T (this is easy to prove; see once again Chang and Keisler, 1990) .
Proof. If every model of T embeds into a model of T , then every quantifier-free -formula that is satisfiable in a model of T is satisfiable in a model of T , too. The converse is by a compactness argument. Let M be a model of T . We show that T ∪ (M) is consistent. If not, we have T |= ¬φ(a), where φ(a) is a finite conjunction of formulas from (M). In more detail, this means that there are a quantifier-free -formula φ(x), and a finite set of elements a from the support of M such that φ(a) is true in M (here φ(a) is obviously the ground a -formula resulting from φ(x) after the replacements x → a). As the constants a do not belong to the signature , we have that T |= ∀x¬φ(x). But φ(x) is a quantifierfree formula satisfiable in a model of T and, by hypothesis, there is a model of T in which φ(x) is satisfiable too, contrary to the fact that T |= ¬∃xφ(x). P EXAMPLE 9. According to Proposition 4.2, T 0 -compatibility reduces to the standard notion of stable infiniteness (used in the disjoint Nelson-Oppen combination procedure) if T 0 is the pure theory of equality (recall, in fact, that in this case, T * 0 is the theory of an infinite set).
EXAMPLE 10. Every theory including the theory
EXAMPLE 11. If T 0 is universal and has a model completion T * 0 and if T ⊇ T * 0 , then T is certainly T 0 -compatible: this trivial case is often interesting (we may take, for example, T 0 to be the theory of linear orders and T to be real arithmetic or linear rational arithmetic). EXAMPLE 12. Let T 0 be a universal theory having a model completion T * 0 , and let T be any extension of T 0 with free function symbols only. In this case, T is T 0 -compatible: to see it, take any model M of T , embed 0 -reduct of M into a model M of T * 0 (see Definition 3.1(i)) and expand in any arbitrary way the interpretation of the free function symbols to the tuples of M not entirely belonging to M.
More examples are supplied in Section 6. An interesting feature of T 0 -compatibility is that it is a modular property; we formally state this fact now and prove it in the Appendix. PROPOSITION 4.4. Let T 1 be a 1 -theory, and let T 2 be a 2 -theory. Suppose they are both compatible with respect to a 0 -theory T 0 (where 0 :
Combining Compatible Theories
Let us progressively fix our main data for the whole paper.
ASSUMPTION (I)
. T 1 is a theory in the signature 1 and T 2 is a theory in the signature 2 ; 0 is the signature 1 ∩ 2 .
Our main aim is that of (semi)deciding the constraint unsatisfiability problem for T 1 ∪ T 2 , given that the corresponding constraint unsatisfiability problems for T 1 and T 2 are (semi)decidable. This amounts to (semi)decide the inconsistency of
where is a finite set of ground literals in the signature 1 ∪ 2 , expanded with a finite set of new free constants. can be purified. In fact, for any literal A ∈ , we have that (1) is equisatisfiable with
where p is a term position in A and c is a further new constant. After finitely many transformations like that from (1) to (2), we can reduce our problem to that of establishing the consistency of a set of sentences like Clearly the consistency of (3) cannot follow from the mere separate consistency of T 1 ∪ 1 and of T 2 ∪ 2 (for trivial reasons, take, e.g., T 1 = T 2 = ∅, 1 = {a 1 = a 2 } and 2 = {a 2 = a 3 , a 1 = a 3 }). To reason modularly, we need some information exchange between a reasoner dealing with T 1 ∪ 1 and a reasoner dealing with T 2 ∪ 2 .
Craig's interpolation theorem for first-order logic ensures that the inconsistency of (3) can be detected by the information exchange of a single a 0 -sentence φ such that T 1 ∪ 1 |= φ and T 2 ∪ 2 ∪{φ} |= ⊥. However, as pointed out in (Tinelli, 2003) , this observation is not very useful, as φ might be any first-order formula, whereas
We leave to the reader the details of this standard step. Of course, one can apply the above transformation until in each literal there is at most one symbol that is not the identity predicate or a free constant, but this method (although correct) would be inefficient. A better solution, which is commonly adopted, is that of abstracting only "alien" subterms; however, there are many different possibilities for defining what an alien subterm is if the signatures are not disjoint (see Baader and Tinelli, 2002a for a detailed discussion). Notice that at the end of this purification process, 0 -literals could be inserted in 1 or in 2 or in both of them, indifferently.
we would like -at least -φ to be quantifier-free: recall that most existing provers detect inconsistency just by Skolemization and saturation, so they are not designed to directly find such a φ (if it is not quantifier-free), even if they can efficiently handle with both T 1 ∪ 1 and T 2 ∪ 2 .
Unfortunately, information exchange of a 0 -quantifier-free formulas alone is not sufficient, even for syntactically simple T 1 and T 2 , to establish the inconsistency of (3) (a counterexample is supplied in Section 7). Consequently, we need a further assumption in order to get limited information exchange without affecting refutational completeness (this is the only relevant assumption we make, the other two being mere notational conventions).
ASSUMPTION (III).
There exists a universal 0 -theory T 0 such that both T 1 and T 2 are T 0 -compatible.
A finite list
of positive ground a 0 -clauses such that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that
is called a positive residue chain. We can now formulate our main combination results, whose proofs can be found in the Appendix.
THEOREM 5.1. With the above assumptions, (T
Thus inconsistency can be detected by repeated exchanges of positive ground clauses only. If we allow information exchange consisting of ground sentences, a single exchange step is sufficient.
THEOREM 5.2. With the above assumptions, (T
Following (Tinelli, 2003) , we say that our T i 's are 0 -convex iff whenever
For 0 -convex theories, an immediate subsumption argument refines Theorem 5.1 in the following way.
In the disjoint signatures case, the concept of a positive residue chain is a declarative formalization of the back-and-forth equality propagation mechanism of the original Nelson-Oppen procedure. For the use of positive ground clauses as residues in reasoners' cooperation (within tableaux methods), see (Zarba, 2002) .
Among 0 -convex theories we have the important class of universal Horn theories; see (Tinelli, 2003) 
Extensions of the Nelson-Oppen Combination Procedure
We say that a universal 0 -theory T 0 is locally finite iff 0 is finite and for every finite set a of new free constants, there are finitely many a 0 -ground terms t 1 , . . . , t k a such that for every further a 0 -ground term u, we have T 0 |= u = t i (for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k a }). If such t 1 , . . . , t k a are effectively computable from a, then T 0 is said to be effectively locally finite. Examples of effectively locally finite theories are the theory of graphs, of partial orders (more generally, any theory whose signature does not contain function symbols), of commutative idempotent monoids, of Boolean algebras, and so forth.
In a locally finite theory T 0 , there are restricted finite classes that are representatives, up to T 0 -equivalence, of the whole classes of a 0 -ground literals, clauses, quantifier free sentences, and so on (they are just the ground literals, clauses, quantifier-free sentences, etc. containing only the above-mentioned terms t 1 , . . . , t k a ). As we can limit information exchange to ground positive clauses and quantifier-free sentences in that restricted representative class, both Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 yield combined decision procedures for the constraint satisfiability problem in T 1 ∪ T 2 (if T 0 is effectively locally finite, both T 1 and T 2 are T 0 -compatible and if the corresponding constraint satisfiability problems for T 1 and T 2 are separately decidable).
The procedure suggested by Theorem 5.1 is just a fair information exchange of positive ground a 0 -clauses, to be continued until the situation gets stable or until an inconsistency is detected. Notice that in case T 1 , T 2 are 0 -convex theories, information exchange can be further limited to ground a 0 -atoms by Corollary 5.3. More formally, the algorithm suggested by Theorem 5.1 can be described as follows. ALGORITHM 6.1.
Step 1: Purify the finite input set of ground literals , thus producing, for some finite set a of free constants, a finite set 1 of ground a 1 -literals and a finite set 2 of ground a 2 -literals (then 1 ∪ 2 is T 1 ∪ T 2 -equisatisfiable with ). In the next loop, positive ground a 0 -clauses are added to 1 , 2 .
Step 2: Using the decision procedures for T 1 , T 2 , check whether T 1 ∪ 1 and T 2 ∪ 2 are consistent (if one of them is not, return "unsatisfiable").
This observation, as shown in (Oppen, 1980a) for the disjoint signatures case, may improve complexity bounds in certain significant situations.
Step 3: If T i ∪ i entails some representative positive ground a 0 -clause (atom in the 0 -convex case) not entailed by T j ∪ j (j = i), add this positive ground clause (atom) to j , and go back to Step 2.
Step 4: If this step is reached, return "satisfiable."
By contrast, the procedure suggested by Theorem 5.2 (which is nothing but an interpolation theorem) identifies all ground a 0 -clauses that are logical consequences of T 1 ∪ 1 and checks whether their conjunction is consistent with T 2 ∪ 2 . There is a third possible (nondeterministic) procedure, which is suggested in the introduction of the paper and which is justified directly by Lemma A.4 from the Appendix: as there are only finitely many 0 -structures generated by a that are models of T 0 (recall that such structures cannot have more than k a -elements), one simply guesses one of them and checks whether its diagram is consistent with both T 1 ∪ 1 and T 2 ∪ 2 .
We give a first example to which these combined procedures apply.
EXAMPLE 13. Let T 1 be linear rational arithmetic, and let T 2 be the theory of total orders endowed with a strict monotonic function f . We take as T 0 the theory of total orders (recall that its model completion T * 0 is the theory of dense total orders without endpoints). T 1 is known to be decidable (Bockmayr and Weispfenning, 2001 ). We leave the reader the little exercise to prove that the constraint satisfiability problem for T 2 is decidable, too: the relevant lemma to be proved shows that any finite total order endowed with a partial strict monotonic function embeds into a model of T 2 (this is shown by successively inserting new points and by taking union in the limit). Once this lemma is proved, the satisfiability of a set 2 of a 2 -ground literals can be decided by a nondeterministic guessing of such a finite total order endowed with a partial strict monotonic function. As T 1 ⊇ T * 0 , T 1 is certainly T 0 -compatible. We need only to show that T 2 is T 0 -compatible, by embedding each model M of T 2 into a model M of T * 0 ∪ T 2 . It is sufficient to take as M the lexicographic product of M with, for example, the poset of rational numbers (the symbol f is interpreted by putting f
, the embedding M → M is defined by associating with b ∈ M the pair (b, 0)). Thus our combination results apply, and we obtain the decidability of the constraint satisfiability problem for rational linear arithmetic endowed with a strict monotonic function. It is not difficult to see that the complexity of this combined decision algorithm lies in the NP-class (just adapt the arguments in Oppen, 1980a) .
To explain our applications to fusion decidability in modal logic, we need to fix some terminology. We shall not directly introduce modal logic; rather, we insist This means that f is constrained by the axiom ∀x∀y ( on the algebraic counterpart of modal logic (this choice makes exposition simpler for the purposes of this paper). A modal algebra is just a Boolean algebra B = B, ∩, 1, ∪, 0, (−) endowed with an hemimorphism P (a hemimorphism is a function preserving only meets and the top element). Hemimorphisms are also called modal (necessity) operators. The modal operator P is said to be transitive iff the identity Pa ≤ PPa holds for every a ∈ B.
Let now 1 be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with a unary function symbol P 1 , and let 2 be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with a unary function symbol P 2 . V 1 is the equational theory of a variety V 1 of modal algebras, and V 2 is the equational theory of another variety V 2 of modal algebras. For i ∈ {1, 2}, V i is a universal Horn theory; hence it is i -convex. This means, in particular, that the decidability of the conditional word problem for V i is equivalent to the decidability of the clausal word problem for V i (and consequently also to the decidability of the constraint satisfiability problem for V i ).
PROPOSITION 6.2. Let V 1 , V 2 be as above; then the decidability of the conditional word problem for V 1 and V 2 implies the decidability of the conditional word problem for V 1 ∪ V 2 .
Proof. As already mentioned, we have for free the decidability of the constraint satisfiability problem in V 1 and V 2 . We take as T 0 the theory of Boolean algebras (which is locally finite and admits as a model completion the theory of atomless Boolean algebras). To apply our results, we simply need to show that V 1 , V 2 are T 0 -compatible. We do it for V 1 . Let M be a model of V 1 . We show how to embed it into a model M of V 1 , which is based on an atomless Boolean algebra. This is a well-known and rather trivial fact, which is used also in (Wolter, 1998) as a side preliminary lemma. Instead of reporting the argument used in (Wolter, 1998) and in (Baader et al., 2004) , too, we give a more direct one. Define a sequence of models of V 1 by M 0 := M, M k+1 := M k ×M k ; define also embeddings δ k : M k → M k+1 by δ k (a) := a, a . Now take as M the union (more precisely, the inductive limit) of this chain. Clearly M is atomless as a Boolean algebra (no nonzero element is minimal in it, as any a ∈ M k gets identified with a, a = a, 0 ∪ 0, a in M k+1 ). P COROLLARY 6.3. Let V 1 , V 2 be as above. If the modal operators P 1 , P 2 are transitive, then the decidability of the word problem for V 1 and V 2 implies the decidability of the word problem for
Proof. This is simply due to the fact that, because of the transitivity of the modal operators, the decidability of the word problem in V i implies the decidability of the conditional word problem in V i (i = 1, 2). In fact, the V i -validity of the conditional equation
Recall that, in a Boolean algebra, y ≤ z is a shorthand for y ∩ z = y. We thank L. Santocanale for suggesting this elegant argument. is equivalent to the V i -validity of the single equation
(where we used the abbreviations P + i x for x∩P i x and x ↔ y for (x ∪y)∩(x∪y )), because of elementary facts concerning congruences in modal algebras. P
The last corollary, once read in terms of logics, means exactly fusion decidability for normal extensions of K4. Although Proposition 6.2 and Corollary 6.3 do not entirely cover the fusion decidability results of (Wolter, 1998) , they put some substantial part of them into the appropriate general combination context. Quite recently, the full results of (Wolter, 1998) have been considerably strengthened in (Baader et al., 2004) , by joining the techniques presented in this paper with those explained in (Baader and Tinelli, 2002a) . For further results (based on a refinement of the combination schema explained in this section) concerning fusion of modal logics sharing a universal modality and nominals; see (Ghilardi and Santocanale, 2003) .
Pure Deductions in a Saturation-Based Framework
Nowadays saturation-based theorem provers are powerful and efficient when treating some instances of specific constraint satisfiability problems. In (Armando et al., 2001) , the authors show that superposition calculus always terminates and gives consequently a decision procedure for such problems, when the involved constraint theory is a theory axiomatizing certain common datatypes such as lists or arrays. In this section we give some further suggestions about a possible use of the ideas explained in Section 5 within saturation-based theorem proving. We show that whenever T 0 -compatibility holds, it is possible to cut in a deduction the inferences that are not pure, while still retaining refutational completeness.
An inference among ( 1 ∪ 2 ) a -clauses
is pure iff there is i = 1, 2 such that all the clauses C 1 , . . . , C n , C are a i -clauses. Similarly, a deduction is pure iff all inferences in it are pure. Usually pure deductions are not able to detect inconsistency of (the Skolemization of) sets of sentences like T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ 2 ; however, we shall see that this may happen when the T 0 -compatibility conditions are satisfied.
To realize this program, we first need to Skolemize the theories T 1 , T 2 , thus passing to theories T 
. , y m ).
Pick a 1 , . . . , a n from |M |; as M |= T , there are b 1 , . . . , b m such that the quantifierfree ground formula φ(a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b m ) is true in M . If a 1 , . . . , a n all belong to the support of M, we choose b i to be precisely f M i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) (this is possible because φ is quantifier-free, hence M |= φ(a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b m ) entails M |= φ(a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b m ) if the a j , b i 's are all from the support of M). We put f M i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) equal to b i , and we are done. P
The case covered by Lemma 7.1 is important. Recall from (Chang and Keisler, 1990 ) that the model completion T * 0 of a universal theory T 0 must have a set of ∀∃-axioms. Hence, the cases in which T 0 -compatibility is trivially ensured by the fact that the axioms for T * 0 are included in the axioms of T are not compromised by the Skolemization process (provided the remaining axioms for T are also ∀∃-sentences).
Lemma 7.1 motivates the following extra assumption (in addition to the three assumptions from Section 5). We take into consideration here the Superposition Calculus I (see Ganzinger, 1990, 1994 and the surveys by Ganzinger, 1998, and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001) . As commonly done in paramodulation-based theorem proving, we assume that identity is the only predicate, and we treat it symmetrically (this means that the equation s = t is identified with the multiset {s, t}). Clauses ‡ like
ASSUMPTION (IV)
Recall that this axiom is replaced in T sk by the axiom
containing the new Skolem function f 1 , . . . , f m . Atomic formulas P (t 1 , . . . , t n ) are seen as equations p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) = . For this and other similar details, see (Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001) .
‡ In this section, we use sequent notation for clauses.
are often identified (e.g., for questions concerning orderings) with the multiset of multisets
We fix a lexicographic path ordering induced by a total precedence on the symbols of sk 1 ∪ sk 2 ∪ {a}; assuming for simplicity that our signatures are finite, this induces a reduction ordering > that is total on ground terms. We give to symbols in a 0 lower precedence than to symbols in sk 1 \ 0 and in sk 2 \ 0 . This strategy is essential: as a consequence, ground a 0 -clauses will be smaller in the twofold multiset extension of > than all ground clauses containing a proper 1 -or 2 -symbol. We recall below the inference rules of the Superposition Calculus I: the application of each rule is subject to the satisfiability of certain ordering constraints, which are essential for the efficiency of the calculus. We do not report such constraints here for the sake of simplicity; we just note that, roughly speaking, they restrict the application of the rules to maximal terms/literals in the respective clauses (see again Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001 , for details):
where, in the first two rules, the premises do not share any variable, and s |p is not a variable; the substitution µ is supposed to be a most general unifier of {s |p , l} in the first two rules and of {s, t} in the last two rules.
THEOREM 7.2. With the above Assumptions (I)-(IV), the set of sentences
Proof. See the Appendix. P
Before concluding this section, we provide an example in which the assumptions of Theorem 7.2 are satisfied and an example in which such assumptions fail.
It is not clear whether the results explained in this section hold if a Knuth-Bendix ordering is adopted.
For term-rewriting terminology see, for example, (Baader and Nipkow, 1998) . EXAMPLE 14. Let T 1 , T 2 be both the theory of Boolean algebras; we assume that the symbols of the bounded distributive lattice language (namely, ∩, ∪, 0, 1) are shared but that the two complements n 1 , n 2 are not. We want to prove that
If we take T 0 to be the theory of bounded distributive lattices (i.e., of distributive lattices with 0 and 1), we see that T 1 , T 2 are T 0 -compatible. Negation, Skolemization, and purification give, for instance, the two sets of literals 1 = {a = n 1 (c), a = b} and 2 = {b = n 2 (c), a = b}. A pure I-refutation exists: the prover SPASS (Weidenbach et al., 1999) produces a pure I-refutation consisting of 28 steps. However, the system is not programmed to avoid impure inferences; hence, during saturation, it impurely derives also (useless) "mixed" clauses containing both n 1 and n 2 . One of them, the atom b ∩ n 1 (n 2 (a)) = b, is also selected as a given clause.
EXAMPLE 15. Let T 1 be the theory of Boolean algebras, and let T 2 be the theory of pseudocomplemented distributive lattices. These are bounded distributive lattices endowed with a unary operator (−) * satisfying the condition
Here (−) * expresses the properties of intuitionistic negation, but in the union theory T 1 ∪ T 2 such operator collapses into the classical complement. This result is evident because the axiom for (−) * implies that x * is the supremum of the set of the elements y such that x ∩ y = 0: as the Boolean complement of x enjoys the same property, clearly it must coincide with x * . Hence, T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ 2 is inconsistent, where 1 , 2 are both empty and T 2 is T 2 ∪ {(a * ) * = a} (here a is a new constant added to the signature of T 2 ). A SPASS refutation takes 43 lines and is highly impure. In fact, a pure refutation cannot exist: the 0 -clauses (i.e. the bounded distributive lattice clauses) that can be exchanged by T 1 ∪ 1 and T 2 ∪ 2 are insufficient to detect inconsistency because they are all logical consequences of both the consistent theories T 1 ∪ 1 ∪{0 = 1} and T 2 ∪ 2 . To show this, we need only observe that any nondegenerated bounded distributive lattice embeds both in a nondegenerated Boolean algebra and in a pseudocomplemented distributive lattice endowed with a noncomplemented element a. Hence, the universal sentences in the bounded distributive lattice language that are deducible from either T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ {0 = 1} or T 2 ∪ 2 are already deducible from the common subtheory of the nondegenerated bounded distributive lattices. Thus, the only possible clause information exchange between T 1 ∪ 1 and T 2 ∪ 2 is limited to the unit clause 0 = 1. Notice that T 2 is not compatible with the 0 -theory T 0 of bounded distributive lattices.
The model completion of T 0 is the theory of atomless Boolean algebras (formulated without the complement in the language), because the theory of atomless Boolean algebras can eliminate quantifiers even without having the complement in the language: in fact, an atomic Boolean formula can be rewritten as the conjunction of equations of the kind x 1 ∪ · · · ∪ x n ∪ y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ y m = 1 (for n, m ≥ 0), and these equations can be written without complement as
This execution is obtained by a default configuration of the prover. By contrast, a nondefault RPO-configuration giving n 1 , n 2 bigger precedence yields an impure refutational proof.
Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper we have extended the Nelson-Oppen combination procedure to the case of theories T 1 , T 2 over nondisjoint signatures, in the presence of compatibility conditions over a common universal subtheory T 0 . The extension we proposed applies to examples of real interest, giving, as shown in Section 6, combined decidability in case T 0 is (effectively) locally finite. Whenever T 0 is not locally finite, our method can be used to limit residue exchange (see Section 5) or in order to forbid impure inferences in saturation-based theorem proving, thus yielding restrictions on the search space during refutation derivations (see Section 7).
Since the early times of modern symbolic logic, quantifier elimination has been considered a powerful technique for decision procedures. In actual approaches to combination problems (see, e.g., Janicic and Bundy, 2002) , specific quantifier elimination algorithms are often invoked as specialized reasoners to be integrated within a flexible general setting dealing with multiple theories. This situation happens, in particular, whenever there is a need to address numerical constraints problems (Bockmayr and Weispfenning, 2001) : examples of such specialized reasoners are the Fourier-Motzkin quantifier elimination procedure (and its refinements Weispfenning, 1988 ) for linear rational arithmetic or Cooper's (Cooper, 1972) , (Oppen, 1978) quantifier elimination procedure for integer Presburger arithmetic. In contrast to this local call for quantifier elimination algorithms, we addressed in this paper quantifier elimination as a global design opportunity for integrated provers in the Nelson-Oppen style.
We note, however, that quantifier-elimination plays only an indirect role in our approach: in this sense, the existence of a model completion for a universal theory T 0 guarantees a certain behavior in combination problems by itself, independent of how quantifier elimination in the model completion is established (this can be established also by semantic nonconstructive arguments, as largely exemplified in the model-theoretic literature). In principle, the quantifier elimination complexity/decidability has nothing to do with the complexity/decidability of our combination methods, simply because quantifier elimination algorithms are not used in them. This point is crucial because most quantifier elimination algorithms are subject to heavy complexity lower bounds, which are often structural lower bounds for the decision of the elementary word problem in the corresponding theories (see the book Ferrante and Rackoff, 1979) . In fact, there are instructive examples showing how complexity can grow from constraint satisfiability problems to decision problems in full first-order language: the most striking one is the case of acyclic lists, where complexity grows from linear (Oppen, 1980b) to nonelementary (Ferrante and Rackoff, 1979; Oppen, 1980b) .
One may wonder how severe is the crucial condition of T 0 -compatibility used in the paper. T 0 -compatibility involves two aspects: the existence of a model completion T * 0 for T 0 and the embeddability of models of T i in models of T i ∪ T *
.
As we have shown in the examples, the existence of a model completion seems to be frequent for theories commonly used in software verification. On the one hand, numeric constraint theories often enjoy this property, in the sense that they eliminate quantifiers (thus being model completions of the theories axiomatized by their respective universal consequences). On the other hand, acyclic lists might probably be the paradigm of situations arising in theories axiomatizing natural datatypes. We note that quantifier elimination strictly depends on the choice of the language: every theory trivially has quantifier elimination in an extended language with infinitely many definitional axioms; hence the problem of obtaining quantifier elimination seems to be mostly a problem of choosing a sufficiently rich but still natural and manageable language.
The question concerning embeddability of models of T i in models of T i ∪ T * 0 looks more problematic; for instance, it can fail in significant situations. Further research is necessary on this point, but we stress that there is a relevant case in which the problem disappears. This is the case in which T i is an extension of T * 0 : we have seen an example in Section 6 where T i is rational linear arithmetic and T 0 is the theory of linear orders. Another example is the theory of acyclic lists L (which coincides with L * ): any extension of the theory of acyclic lists with extra structures matches our requirements, and the advantages of our method (limited residue exchange, elimination of impure inferences, etc.) apply to all combinations of theories obtained in this way.
An interesting point for future development relies on the following research problem: how to relax local finiteness while still guaranteeing the convergence of the modular combination procedure. Here one may take advantage of algebraic notions such as "noetherianity" for congruences. Notice, however, that local finiteness is already a much weaker requirement than other analogous notions known from the literature. For instance, in (Baader and Tinelli, 2002b) , a 0 -theory T 0 is said to be finitary modulo a renaming iff there is a finite set of 0 -terms S such that for every further 0 -term u there are t ∈ S and a renaming σ such that T 0 |= u = tσ . This is a stronger condition than local finiteness: in fact, locally finite theories (like Boolean algebras), in which the number k a of nonequivalent ground a 0 -terms grows more than polynomially in the cardinality of a, cannot be finitary modulo a renaming.
Other efforts reported in the literature have tried to extend the Nelson-Oppen combination method to theories sharing function and predicate symbols (different from equality). We leave aside interesting recent results (Baader and Tinelli, 2002a; Fiorentini and Ghilardi, 2003) on combined word problems because (as pointed out in Baader and Tinelli, 1997) they cannot be appropriately seen as generalizations of the Nelson-Oppen combination procedure. Rather, we concentrate here on (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003) , which is directly related to the subject.
The starting point of any attempt to generalize the Nelson-Oppen procedure to the nondisjoint case should first answer the following question: What is the specific feature of the stable infiniteness requirement that we want to generalize? In this paper we answered the question by saying that infinite models are just existentially closed models of the pure theory of equality, and we based our further investigations on this observation. On the contrary, in (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003) the authors notice that infinite models are just free models of the pure theory of equality with infinitely many generators. This notion leads to a completely different research direction, whose results can only very roughly be reported here. Let T be a theory in the signature , and let 0 be a finite subsignature of ; say that "T is stably 0 -free (over a certain constraint language) iff every constraint (in the language) satisfiable in T is satisfiable in a model of T whose 0 -reduct is a free structure with infinitely many generators" (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003, p. 296) . The main notion in (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003) is that of N-O combinability of two theories T 1 , T 2 over signatures 1 , 2 (admitting 0 as a common subsignature): N-O combinability guarantees, in essence, that "the satisfiability in a theory T 1 ∪T 2 of the conjunction of two pure constraints φ 1 ∧φ 2 can be reduced to the local satisfiability of φ 1 in T 1 and φ 2 in T 2 by adding to both formulas an appropriate 0 -restriction, a particular kind of first-order restriction on the free variables shared by φ 1 and φ 2 ." One of the main results in (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003) (Theorem 48, p. 328) says that T 1 , T 2 are N-O combinable provided they are both stably 0 -free and provided some additional conditions are satisfied.
Apart from technical details, we underline here that the notion of infinitely generated free and of existentially closed structure are quite different and their coincidence for the pure theory of equality should be considered a rather exceptional fact. To see how the two notions can diverge, consider the case of torsion-free Abelian groups: free Abelian groups are torsion-free, but they are never divisible, whereas divisibility is just the necessary and sufficient condition for being existentially closed. Notice also that free structures may not exist for a theory, whereas every model of a universal theory T 0 embeds in a model that is existentially closed for T 0 (see Chang and Keisler, 1990) . These remarks should make evident that the generalization of the Nelson-Oppen procedure presented in (Tinelli and Ringeissen, 2003) is quite different from that presented in this paper.
Before closing, we remark that the idea (suggested in Tinelli, 2003) of using interpolation theorems in order to limit residue exchange in partial theory reasoning (whenever the background reasoner has to deal with combined theories) inspired some of the material presented in Section 5. The main problem addressed in (Tinelli, 2003) is general reasoners' interaction (more precisely, reasoners' interaction in a variable free tableaux framework), and the results explained there assume almost nothing about the component theories. In this paper, on the contrary, we focus on contexts in which a specific requirement -T 0 -compatibility -is satisfied. Thanks to this requirement, we can, contrary to the methods of (Tinelli, 2003) , restrict the shape of the residues to be exchanged, thus getting decidability in the (effectively) locally finite case.
See (Chang and Keisler, 1990) for this notion and its relationship to model completeness.
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Appendix: Proofs of the Combination Results
This appendix is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 5.1, 5.2, and 7.2 and of Proposition 4.4. To begin, we introduce some additional model-theoretic background. The proof of this theorem can be easily deduced from Craig's Interpolation theorem (alternatively, a direct proof using a double chain argument is possible; see Chang and Keisler, 1990, pp. 141-142) .
Next, we need a lemma that is a little variation on Robinson's Diagram theorem. Let A be a -structure, and let a be a finite set of elements from |A|; we say that a generates A iff for every b ∈ |A| there exists a -term t (x) such that A |= t (a) = b. More generally, for a finite subset a ⊆ |A|, the -substructure generated by a is the smallest substructure of A containing a: one can easily see that the support of such a substructure is formed by the elements b ∈ |A| such that we have A |= b = t (a), for some -term t (x). LEMMA A.2. Suppose that the -structures A, A are generated by the finite subsets a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), respectively. Let x be the tuple of variables (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and suppose also that for every -atom A(x), ‡ we have A |= A(a) iff A |= A(a ). Then the bijection a i → a i extends to an isomorphism between A and A .
Proof. Define the isomorphism µ as follows: As for every element b ∈ |A|, we have A |= b = t (a) for some -term t (x). Let us put µ(b) = b iff A |= b = t (a ). This is well defined and does not depend on the choice of t, because for every u(x), we have A |= t (a) = u(a) iff A |= t (a ) = u(a ). By considering the term x i , one immediately sees that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have µ(a i ) = a i .
Moreover, for every atom B(y 1 , . . . , y m ) and for every m-tuple of elements b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ |A|, we have
By abuse, we sometimes confuse a finite set with a tuple of distinct elements. Obviously, t (a) is the a -ground term resulting from the replacements x → a. Notice that, here and in similar situations, A is expanded to a a,b -structure by interpreting the names of the a, b's into themselves.
‡ Recall that we use the notation A(x) to mean that A contains at most the free variables x.
In fact, if A |= b j = t j (a) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the condition A |= 
(a). P
Let us now work under Assumptions (I), (II), (III) from Section 5. That is, we fix a 1 -theory T 1 , a 2 -theory T 2 (both compatible with respect to a 0 = 1 ∩ 2 -universal theory T 0 ); we also fix a finite set of free constants a, a finite set 1 of ground a 1 -literals and a finite set 2 of ground a 2 -literals. We say that a set 0 of positive ground a 0 -clauses is saturated iff it is closed under the two rules
LEMMA A.3. Suppose that 0 is saturated and does not contain the empty clause. Then there exist
moreover, M 1 and M 2 share the same 0 -substructure generated by the elements (denoted by) a.
Proof. A set of ground a 0 -literals is said to be exhaustive iff it contains for every ground a 0 -atom A, either A itself or its negation. The statement of the lemma is proved if we are able to find an exhaustive set of ground a 0 -literals that is consistent with both T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ 0 and T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ 0 . In this case, in fact, given any two models M 1 |= T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ 0 ∪ and M 2 |= T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ 0 ∪ , we have that their 0 -substructures generated by a are 0 -isomorphic by Lemma A.2 (hence we may assume that they are just the same substructure, by renaming some elements in one of the supports, if needed).
We adapt the notion of productive clause used today in proofs of refutational completeness for various variants of resolution and paramodulation calculi (see Ganzinger, 1990, 1994) . Consider any terminating strict total order on ground a 0 -atoms and extend it to a terminating strict total order > for positive ground 
The definition is by transfinite induction on >. Say that the clause C ≡ A∨A 1 ∨ · · ·∨A n from 0 is productive (and produces the atom A) iff (i) 
(with maximum atoms A 1 , . . . , A n , respectively), such that
that is, such that
By trivial logical manipulations, it follows that
As C 1 , . . . , C n are clauses in 0 and as 0 is saturated, the clause 
Proof. By using suitable embeddings (supplied by the definition T 0 -compatibility), we can embed the M i into models M i of T i ∪ T * 0 . By renaming some elements in the supports if needed, we can also freely suppose that A is still a common substructure of M 1 and M 2 and that the sets |M 1 | \ |A| and |M 2 | \ |A| are disjoint. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose that there is no positive residue chain ending up with the empty clause. We build a saturated set 0 of positive ground a 0 -clauses in ω steps. Let 0 be the empty set; if k has already been defined, let k+1 be the set of positive ground a 0 -clauses C such that T i ∪ i ∪ k |= C holds for i = 1 or i = 2. Clearly k ⊆ k+1 ; moreover, by the compactness theorem for firstorder logic, it is clear that 0 = k k is saturated. Notice also that a clause C belongs to k+1 (k ≥ 0) iff there is a positive residue chain C 1 , . . . , C n , C such that C 1 , . . . , C n all belong to k (this is easily proved by induction on k and by compactness again).
‡ Consequently, 0 does not contain the empty clause and Lemma A.3 applies. This means that there are a a 1 -model M 1 |= T 1 ∪ 1 and a a 2 -model M 2 |= T 2 ∪ 2 whose 0 -substructures generated by a are the same. We can now apply Lemma A.4 to M 1 , M 2 , A (where A is this 0 -substructure generated by a). By that lemma, there are a
This implies, in particular, that µ 1 (a) = µ 2 (a) holds for all a ∈ |A|: in fact, M is a ( 1 ∪
2 ) |A| -model and the µ i are |A| i -embeddings; hence we have µ 1 (a) = a M = µ 2 (a). Notice that the latter embedding is elementary, whereas the former needs not be such. ‡ The induction step is as follows: if C ∈ k+1 , then there are C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ k such that T i ∪ i ∪ {C 1 , . . . , C n } |= C holds for i = 1 or i = 2. Now it is sufficient to append C to any juxtaposition of positive residue chains ending up in C 1 , . . . , C n . and |A| i -embeddings M i → M. As M i |= i , we have also M |= i (i = 1, 2) (recall that the i 's are sets of ground a 0 -literals, so their truth is preserved by |A| i -embeddings). Thus M |= T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ 2 , so the latter set is indeed consistent. P Proof of Theorem 5.2. We reduce this theorem to the previous one. If T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ 2 is inconsistent, there is a positive residue chain C 1 , . . . , C n ending up with the empty clause. Say that C k is an i-residue (i = 1, 2) iff T i ∪ i ∪ {C 1 , . . . , C k−1 } |= C k . Let ψ k (for k = 1, . . . , n) be the quantifier-free ground a 0 -formula ¬C 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬C k−1 ∨ C k , and let φ be the conjunction of the ψ k such that C k is a 1-residue. Clearly, T 1 ∪ 1 |= φ. Moreover, by induction, one can easily see that T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {φ} |= C j for all j = 1, . . . , n: in fact, if C j is a 2-residue, then T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {C 1 , . . . , C j −1 } |= C j (hence T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {φ} |= C j by induction hypothesis) and if C j is a 1-residue, then {φ} |= ¬C 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬C j −1 ∨ C j (hence T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {φ} |= C j again by induction hypothesis). As T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {φ} |= C j holds for all j , we have in particular that T 2 ∪ 2 ∪ {φ} |= ⊥ for j = n. P
The same argument used for the proof of Lemma A.4 gives also the following proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Take a model M of T 1 ∪ T 2 and embeds its i -reducts into models M i of T i ∪ T * 0 (i = 1, 2). We can freely suppose that the embeddings are inclusions and that we have |M| = |M 1 |∩|M 2 | for supports. Now ; let us call µ the common restriction of µ 1 and µ 2 to |M|. We show that µ is a 1 ∪ 2 -embedding of M into N . Observe in fact that for every n-ary i -function symbol f and for every n-tuple b of elements from the support of M, we have
analogously, for every n-ary i -predicate symbol P , we have P (µ(b) ).
This proves that µ : M −→ N is a 1 ∪ 2 -embedding. P
We have left to prove Theorem 7.2: here we need also Assumption (IV) from Section 7; that is, we suppose that T 1 , T 2 are axiomatized by ∀∃-sentences and that T run Superposition Calculus I with respect to a lexicographic path ordering, giving lower precedence to shared a 0 -symbols. Our main task is that of reaching the model-theoretic configuration of Lemma A.4 within the model generation construction of Ganzinger, 1990, 1994) . As this is a laborious construction, we cannot make the exposition completely self-contained. However, we closely follow notations and definitions from (Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001 ).
Proof of Theorem 7.2. We know that T 1 ∪ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ 2 is consistent iff T 
